معرفی
Prof. Dr. Dominik Karos is a Professor at Bielefeld University, specifically affiliated with the Faculty of Economics and the Institute for Mathematical Economics (IMW). He serves as an academic advisor for the Master Quantitative Economics program and is a faculty member of both the Bielefeld Graduate School in Theoretical Sciences and the Bielefeld Graduate School of Economics and Management (BIGSEM). Additionally, he is a member of the Center for Uncertainty Studies (CeUS) and serves on the Senate - Group of University Professors.
Prof. Karos specializes in game theory, microeconomics, and mathematical economics. His research focuses on bargaining theory, social choice, information economics, and welfare analysis. He has developed theoretical frameworks for understanding farsighted rationality in coalition formation, axiomatic bargaining solutions, strategic information selection, and the welfare effects of information exchange. His work bridges theoretical economic models with practical applications in market design, voting systems, and decision-making under uncertainty.
Prof. Karos teaches a range of advanced economics courses including Microeconomics 1-3, Game Theory, and various elective courses. He serves as the module responsible for multiple graduate-level courses and supervises master's theses through the International Track program. His expertise in game theory and networks is recognized within the department, where he is listed as an expert in these areas.
- Research Fellow, Center for Uncertainty Studies (CeUS)
- Faculty Member, Bielefeld Graduate School in Theoretical Sciences
- Faculty Member, BIGSEM - Bielefeld Graduate School of Economics and Management
- Member, Senate - Group of University Professors
- Academic Advisor, Master Quantitative Economics program
Prof. Karos's research demonstrates a consistent focus on the theoretical foundations of economic decision-making, with particular emphasis on how agents form beliefs, make strategic choices, and reach agreements under various informational and institutional constraints. His recent work explores the implications of farsighted rationality, the design of optimal information structures, and the welfare consequences of information exchange in strategic settings.
