معرفی
Claudio Mezzetti is the Leverhulme Professor of Industry and Organisation at the University of Warwick. His research focuses on mechanism design, game theory, and auction theory, particularly the design of incentives in markets and organizations to achieve economic efficiency despite information asymmetries and bounded rationality.
His work explores sequential auctions, revenue maximization, contractual arrangements in common agency scenarios, and strategic disclosure in innovation markets. He has contributed to understanding bounded rationality in dynamic oligopolies and the evolutionary properties of economic systems.
His key research themes include the study of auctions (especially sequential formats), the impact of informational externalities, and the interplay between intellectual property and strategic behavior in patent races. He has also analyzed trust-based mechanisms in artificial intelligence and learning dynamics in non-cooperative games.
His publications span leading journals such as Games and Economic Behavior, Econometrica, and Journal of Economic Theory. His current research includes projects on manipulative disclosure, ex-post implementation, and information acquisition in bargaining.
Dr. Mezzetti holds a Leverhulme Professorship, reflecting his contributions to the field of industrial organization and mechanism design.
