Patrick Schmitz

Patrick Schmitz is Professor of Economics at the University of Cologne's Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences within the Department of Political Science, holding this position since 2006 while maintaining a Research Fellowship at the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) in London since 2005.

His academic foundation includes:

• Master in Economics (Diplom-Volkswirt), University of Bonn (1994)
• Ph.D. in Economics (Dr. rer. pol.), University of Bonn (1999)
• Habilitation in Economics, University of Bonn (2004)

Schmitz's research centers on contract theory, economic incentives, and institutional design with emphases on incomplete contracts, asymmetric information, and property rights. His work uniquely bridges microeconomic theory and political science through experimental investigations of contractual arrangements in public-private partnerships, procurement systems, and ownership allocation, revealing how social preferences and information asymmetries shape real-world outcomes.

His 2010-2013 publications demonstrate a methodological shift toward experimental validation of theoretical models, particularly examining contract enforcement in public-private collaborations and the behavioral dimensions of the hold-up problem. These works, frequently co-authored with Eva Hoppe, establish empirical foundations for contract theory in top journals like Review of Economic Studies and RAND Journal of Economics.

Major recognitions include:

• Hans-Kelsen-Prize from University of Cologne (2015)
• Ranking among Germany's 15 most productive economists (Handelsblatt, 2015)
• Karl-Arnold-Prize from NRW Academy of Sciences (2006)
• Selection to Capital magazine's 'Young Elite' (2007)

As chair holder of the Political Science Seminar, Schmitz mentors emerging scholars including Professor Eva Hoppe-Fischer (University of Bonn) and Professor David Kusterer (Erasmus University Rotterdam), while his CEPR affiliation connects him to global industrial organization research. His sustained publication record in premier journals indicates robust research funding despite unreported specific grants.

He leads the Political Science Seminar research group at Cologne, focusing on theoretical-experimental synthesis in contract design, with ongoing collaborations through CEPR's Industrial Organization Programme examining institutional responses to information asymmetries in market and political contexts.