Eva Hoppe

Dr. Eva Hoppe is an academic researcher specializing in applied microeconomics with a primary focus on contract theory and experimental economics. She received her doctorate from the University of Cologne in February 2011 and has established a research profile through the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), where she has published multiple discussion papers investigating contractual design under information asymmetry.

Her educational background centers on her doctoral studies at the University of Cologne, completed in February 2011. This foundational training positioned her to explore complex economic interactions through rigorous experimental methodologies.

Dr. Hoppe's research interests span contract theory, experimental economics, and industrial organization, with particular expertise in:

• Moral hazard and adverse selection problems
• Public infrastructure contracting
• Public-private partnership structures
• Social preferences in contractual relationships
• Experimental validation of economic theories

Her publication record from 2010-2018 reveals a consistent trajectory in applying experimental methods to test contract-theoretic models. Key thematic threads include the design of incentive-compatible contracts for public projects, the impact of hidden action on outcome contractibility, and the role of social preferences in shaping contractual behavior. Her work bridges theoretical economic models with empirical validation through controlled laboratory experiments, contributing significantly to understanding optimal contract design in real-world economic contexts.