Nick Smyth

Nick Smyth is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Fordham University, where he also held a Post-doctoral Fellowship. He earned his PhD from Brown University in 2017. His research focuses on Meta-Ethics, Normative Ethics, Moral Psychology, and Social and Political Philosophy, with particular engagement in Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy and Bernard Williams' ethical theories. He serves as a PhilPapers editor for Anti-Theory, Moral Luck, and Authenticity.

His work critiques traditional moral frameworks, exploring topics like political conservatism, pragmatic genealogy, and structural injustice. He emphasizes the role of historical and cultural analysis in moral epistemology, arguing for the necessity of real-world history over abstract theorizing. Recent contributions challenge anti-natalism’s philosophical assumptions and examine how self-interest influences moral belief-formation.

Publications span ethical theory, political philosophy, and genealogical methods, often addressing conceptual shifts from ancient to modern ethics. He critiques psychological debunking strategies and advocates for a deontological approach to conceptual engineering. Smyth’s interdisciplinary approach integrates social science insights with philosophical analysis, focusing on moral disagreement and the functions of moral systems.