Marco Ottaviani
استاد · Organizational Economics
Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munichمعرفی
Marco Ottaviani is a Professor at Bocconi University specializing in information and incentive problems at the intersection of organizational economics, industrial organization, regulation, and finance. His research addresses prediction markets, information aggregation in organizations, regulation of information intermediaries, consumer protection, privacy, financing of innovation, and clinical trial design.
He earned a PhD in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and previously taught at University College London, the London Business School, and the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University before returning to Bocconi.
His core research domains include:
- Organizational Economics
- Industrial Organization
- Regulation
- Finance
- Information Economics
Recent publications (2020-2024) reveal consistent focus on grant design mechanics, clinical trial credibility frameworks, selective disclosure dynamics, and information market structures, all examining strategic information manipulation under incentive constraints.
His grant-making research, particularly the 2024 paper "Designing Scientific Grants", analyzes funding allocation mechanisms to optimize research integrity and scientific output through incentive-compatible design principles.
