Professor Anton Kolotilin is a faculty member at the University of New South Wales (UNSW), affiliated with the UNSW Business School. His research focuses on Microeconomic Theory and Information Economics, with particular emphasis on strategic communication, persuasion mechanisms, and game-theoretic models. He has contributed significantly to understanding optimal information disclosure strategies, the design of persuasive communication frameworks, and the economic implications of partisan gerrymandering. His work intersects with political economy, experimental design, and network formation models. Professor Kolotilin has an extensive publication record with over 13 journal articles, 3 working papers, and 13 preprints. His recent research explores topics such as the duality of persuasion, censorship as an optimal strategy, and the application of linear programming to information design. He frequently collaborates on interdisciplinary projects, bridging theoretical economics with practical policy analysis. Key research interests include mechanism design, Bayesian persuasion, strategic information transmission, and the analysis of social and economic networks. While no specific grants or awards are listed, his prolific output underscores his contributions to academic discourse in economics and related fields.











