Yukio Koriyama

Yukio Koriyama is a Full Professor at the Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique, part of the Institute Polytechnique of Paris. He is affiliated with CREST (Center for Research in Economics and Statistics). His research focuses on game theory, social choice, public economics, and institutional design, with particular emphasis on fair division, electoral systems, and collective decision-making mechanisms. He currently supervises three PhD students and teaches advanced courses in microeconomics, market design, and social choice theory at University Paris-Saclay and Ecole Polytechnique.

His work explores theoretical and experimental approaches to understanding strategic behavior in political and economic contexts. Notable contributions include analyses of voting mechanisms, cognitive hierarchies in games, and the design of institutions to address collective action problems. He has published in top journals such as Theoretical Economics, Journal of Political Economy, and Games and Economic Behavior.

Recent research highlights include experimental studies on electoral turnout dynamics and impossibility theorems linking Pareto efficiency with incentive compatibility. His writings also address practical policy issues like US presidential election reforms and participatory budgeting mechanisms.