Sandrine Ollier

Sandrine Ollier serves as a Lecturer at the University of Franche-Comté within the Faculty of Law, Economics, Political Science and Management. She maintains active research affiliation with CRESE (Research Center on Economic Strategies), contributing to the institution's theoretical economics profile.

Her research concentrates on incentive theory and principal-agent problems, specifically examining adverse selection and moral hazard dynamics in contractual relationships. This work spans foundational contract theory, with significant contributions to understanding participation constraints, limited liability effects, and generalized principal-agent frameworks. Her publications consistently address information asymmetry challenges in economic modeling.

Ollier's scholarly output demonstrates sustained theoretical rigor in economics, with publications in high-impact journals like the Journal of Economic Theory. Her research trajectory shows deep engagement with mathematical economic modeling techniques applied to institutional design problems.

As an active member of CRESE, she participates in the center's research ecosystem focused on strategic economic analysis. Her work contributes to the center's reputation in theoretical microeconomics and contract theory within the French academic landscape.