Martin Smith

Martin Smith is a Professor in the School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences at the University of Edinburgh. Originally from Australia, he joined the University of Edinburgh in 2016 after previously working at the University of Glasgow and the University of St Andrews. He completed his PhD at the Australian National University School of Philosophy in 2005.

Professor Smith's research focuses on epistemology, logic, and philosophy of law. His work explores the relationship between probability, justification, and belief, with particular attention to normic theory - his alternative to probabilistic approaches to epistemic justification. He has made significant contributions to understanding legal standards of proof, risk assessment, and the nature of epistemic justification. His research often bridges philosophical theory with practical applications in legal contexts, particularly regarding how statistical evidence should be treated in legal proceedings.

Smith's recent publications demonstrate a consistent focus on the interplay between justification, probability, and normalcy. His work challenges conventional probabilistic approaches to epistemic justification and legal standards of proof, proposing instead frameworks based on notions of normalcy and risk. This research trajectory has important implications for understanding how we form justified beliefs, how courts should evaluate evidence, and how decision theory might accommodate non-probabilistic conceptions of risk.

• Co-investigator on the AHRC research project "Varieties of Risk" (Sep 2020-Jun 2023)
• Co-investigator on the AHRC research project "The Whole Truth" (Jan 2016-Aug 2017)
• Principal investigator on the AHRC project "Justification and Probability" (Sep 2014-May 2015)

Professor Smith is an active researcher who regularly publishes in top philosophy journals. His work has been influential in contemporary debates about epistemic justification, particularly through his development of the normic theory as an alternative to probabilistic accounts. He has also established himself as a significant voice in philosophical discussions about legal standards of proof and the proper role of statistical evidence in legal contexts.