معرفی
David A. Miller is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts. He holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University (2004) and previously served as an Assistant Professor at the University of California, San Diego. His research focuses on repeated game models, cooperative behavior, and mechanisms to narrow equilibrium sets for realism. Key areas include renegotiation in contracts, social networks supporting cooperation, and collusion constraints in cartels.
Miller's research interests span Game Theory, Repeated Games, Mechanism Design, Social Networks, and Contracts. His work explores how social networks influence cooperative behavior, the role of renegotiation in contractual design, and how asymmetric information affects collusion sustainability. Notable contributions include studies on ostracism, forgiveness in repeated interactions, and enforcement in networked societies.
His publications highlight trends in cooperative game theory, strategic network formation, and the intersection of private information with collusion dynamics. Miller has contributed to debates on market entry during the Dot Com era and the design of robust relational contracts. His research underscores the importance of realistic equilibrium selection in economic models.
No scientific awards are explicitly listed in the provided texts. His advising record is not detailed, but his research collaborations and grants remain unspecified. Miller’s professional activities include maintaining an academic homepage and CV available through the University of Michigan’s Department of Economics.
