Daniel R. Vincent

Professor Daniel R. Vincent holds the rank of Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Maryland, College Park. He specializes in applying game theory to trading environments, with a focus on auction theory, mechanism design, and antitrust economics. His research explores dynamic bargaining, revenue-maximizing selling mechanisms, and two-sided markets. He has held visiting roles at institutions like Caltech and Arizona State University, and contributed to the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. His teaching includes advanced microeconomics and market design courses.

Education: PhD in Economics from Princeton University (1987), MA from Oxford University, and BA in History from the University of Toronto. Former academic positions include roles at the University of Western Ontario and Northwestern University.

Research Interests: Mechanism design, auctions, industrial organization, antitrust policy, and two-sided markets. Recent work addresses multi-object trading environments and platform competition under no-surcharge rules. His collaborations include papers with co-authors like Alejandro Manelli and Marius Schwartz.

Scientific Achievements: Rhodes Scholar (1980s), extensive publication record in top journals like Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, and Journal of Industrial Economics.

Advising: Supervised doctoral students such as Haiwen Zhou (Old Dominion University) and Niswan Erkal (University of Melbourne). Active in curriculum development, teaching courses like ECON415 Market Design and ECON703 Advanced Microeconomics I.