Winand Emons

Winand Emons serves as Professor of Economics at the University of Bern, specializing in Industrial Organization and Competition Policy. His research bridges theoretical and experimental approaches to antitrust enforcement and market regulation.

His primary research focuses on strategic communication in markets, leniency program effectiveness, and antitrust deterrence mechanisms. Key contributions analyze how firms collude under varying penalty structures, the economics of expert advice markets, and experimental evidence on optimal sanction design. His work consistently addresses information asymmetry and incentive design in regulatory contexts.

Recent publications reveal a trend toward experimental validation of antitrust theories and innovative enforcement mechanisms, particularly examining private damages actions and rebating systems. His research spans theoretical modeling, laboratory experiments, and policy-relevant analysis of cartel behavior and communication costs.

Emons actively contributes to CEPR's Industrial Organization program, with publications classified under JEL codes D43, K21, K42, L40, and D82. His collaborations with researchers like Severin Lenhard and Claude Fluet demonstrate consistent focus on regulatory design and market failure correction.