Francesc Dilmé

Francesc Dilmé is an Associate Professor at the University of Bonn's Institute for Microeconomics, affiliated with the Bonn Graduate School of Economics and Hausdorff Center for Mathematics (HCM). Since 2019, he has been a cluster member and received the ERC Starting Grant (2020) for "Information Transmission in Markets" (2021-2026), while serving on the American Economic Review editorial board.

His educational background includes:

• Mathematics and Physics studies in Barcelona
• Economics MSc in London
• PhD from University of Pennsylvania (2013)

Dilmé specializes in Microeconomic Theory, focusing on dynamic games, asymmetric information, and bargaining. His research analyzes strategic communication, relational contracts, and market design under imperfect information, with emphasis on equilibrium stability and robust information transmission mechanisms. Recent work explores binary private information, random price discounts, and repeated trade dynamics.

His 2019-2025 publications reveal a concentrated focus on dynamic microeconomic models, particularly information transmission in bargaining and market contexts. Key trends include equilibrium refinements in signaling games, relational contracting under asymmetric information, and strategic communication with minimal conflict of interest, often bridging theoretical rigor with market applications.

Scientific recognition includes:

• ERC Starting Grant (2020) for "Information Transmission in Markets"

He directs ERC-funded research (2021-2026) and co-organizes the European Economic Theory Conference (EETC) and Christmas Microeconomic Theory Conference in Bonn (CriMicTheConBon). As Associate Professor, he likely supervises graduate students through the Bonn Graduate School of Economics, though specific advisees aren't listed.

Dilmé actively contributes to collaborative research through the HCM and Bonn's microeconomic theory cluster, focusing on foundational aspects of dynamic strategic interaction and information economics.