Fran Flanagan

Fran Flanagan is a Lecturer in the Department of Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, specializing in the economic analysis of legal institutions and market design. Her work bridges theoretical microeconomics with practical applications in jury selection and matching mechanisms.

Her primary research domains include:

• Law and Economics
• Microeconomic Theory
• Market Design
• Matching Theory
• Jury Selection
• Criminal Justice Systems

She investigates how institutional rules—particularly peremptory challenges in jury selection and matching algorithms—affect outcomes, stability, and equity in constrained allocation environments.

Analysis of her 2014-2025 publications reveals consistent application of game theory to legal and institutional problems. Key trends include racial/gender disparities in jury outcomes, theoretical advances in matching markets with contracts, and mechanism design for housing allocation and jury composition. Her work demonstrates how procedural rules systematically distort outcomes and proposes incentive-compatible alternatives.

No scientific awards are documented in available sources. Information regarding student advising, research grants, laboratories, or collaborative teams is not provided in the source material.