Argyrios Deligkas

Argyrios Deligkas serves as a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Computer Science at Royal Holloway, University of London, where he is affiliated with both the Centre for Intelligent Systems and the Centre for Reliable Machine Learning. His research profile highlights extensive contributions to theoretical computer science with practical economic applications, maintaining active collaboration networks across international institutions.

His core research focuses on Algorithmic Game Theory and Mechanism Design, particularly examining computational aspects of equilibrium concepts, fair division protocols, and complexity barriers in multi-agent systems. Recent work investigates the PPA complexity class's limitations, envy-free allocation criteria (EF1/EFX), and strategic behavior in facility location games, demonstrating how theoretical computer science frameworks can resolve economic modeling challenges.

Analysis of his 2024-2025 publications reveals a concentrated effort on computational hardness in fair division (e.g., pizza-sharing problems) and equilibrium approximation, with methodologies spanning combinatorial optimization, randomized algorithms, and complexity theory. These works consistently bridge theoretical guarantees with real-world applicability in resource allocation systems.

As Principal Investigator for the EPSRC-funded NAfANE project (2024-2026), he leads research into novel approximation techniques for Nash equilibria. While specific advisees aren't listed in the source material, his senior lecturer role implies active supervision of postgraduate researchers within Royal Holloway's computer science ecosystem.

His institutional affiliations with the Centre for Intelligent Systems and Centre for Reliable Machine Learning position him at the forefront of trustworthy AI development, where theoretical foundations directly inform robust machine learning system design.