Alan Hájek

Professor Alan Hájek is a faculty member at the Australian National University, affiliated with the School of Philosophy, Centre for Moral, Social and Political Theory, and Centre for Philosophy of the Sciences. His work bridges formal epistemology, probability theory, and decision theory.

• Expertise: Counterfactual reasoning, Bayesian epistemology, and infinite utility paradoxes.
• Roles: Professor in multiple interdisciplinary philosophy centers.

His research interests focus on the foundations of probability, decision-making under uncertainty, and the intersection of formal methods with philosophical questions. Recent publications analyze counterfactual semantics, Pascal’s Wager, and triviality results in probabilistic frameworks.

The 15 most recent articles span 2021–2025, emphasizing counterfactual logic (e.g., Most counterfactuals are false), decision theory (e.g., Satan, Saint Peter and Saint Petersburg), and epistemic paradoxes (e.g., The cable guy paradox).